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1. Introduction
It has often been argued that Egoism is by definition incompatible with morality. We will
challenge this viewpoint in the following analysis, arguing that the assumption of incompatibility
rests on a false premise. This will allow us to enquire whether or not Egoism can provide a basis
for morality. To answer in the affirmative, it is sufficient to show that the claim that Egoism
could be such a basis cannot in all cases be refuted.
2. Gert Against Egoism
Bernard Gert's book Morality  Its Nature and Justification puts forward a strong argument
against the compatibility of the two concepts Egoism and morality. According to the Gert,
morality has to be a rational principle that can be applied universally to all rational persons. He
further states that morality functions not only as a guide for the individual person who adopts it
but also that a person who adopts it must also propose its adoption by everyone. The scholar
concludes that Egoism cannot lie within this definition of morality, because no one would put
forward ethical egoism to be adopted by everyone.1
Gert's argument is vulnerable, however, because he does not justify the claim that one has to
promote a moral guide, which one adopts. The reasoning behind this claim could be presumed
to look as follows:
Premise 1: If I adopt a moral guide, I must be convinced that this moral guide is right.
Premise 2: If I am convinced that something is right, I have to promote it.
Conclusion: If I adopt a moral guide, I have to promote that everyone adopts it. I cannot
adopt Ethical Egoism as a moral principle because I would not promote it.
On closer inspection, premise 2 is not true; it is perfectly possible to believe that something is
right without promoting it. If you are convinced of the validity of a moral guide, this means
1 Bernard Gert, Morality  Its Nature and Justification (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Ox-
ford Scholarship Online, Oxford University Press, http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195176898.001.0001, accessed on
29.10.2008), p. 8
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that you have to think that if everyone else were rational, then they should adopt the principle.
The crucial point is that this should is not to be understood in the sense that you want the
other person to adopt it. It is merely a should in the sense that you think the adoption would
be reasonable from the other person's point of view.
3. Wanting Others to be Irrational
As an example, consider the difference between telling your husband that he should never cheat
on you and telling your friend that she should better not cheat on her husband because this
might bring her into a lot of trouble if she were found out. In the first case, the should simply
expresses your preference: You do not want to be betrayed. This is not the should involved in
thinking that others should adopt a moral principle. Here, should takes the rationally evalua-
tive meaning, which is paralleled in the advice given to the friend who considers adulterousness.
In this sense, if Kathrin thinks James should adopt Ethical Egoism if he were rational, this
does not mean that she necessarily wants him to adopt it. If Kathrin does not want James
to adopt the principle, she will not promote it. As one can see, from being convinced that
something is right it does not necessarily follow that one has to promote it.
Premise 2 therefore has to be adapted. This changes the definition of a moral guide. Now,
adopting a moral principle means that you have to be convinced that everyone else would act
rationally by adopting it but it does not necessarily mean that you have to promote it. This
allows us to view Egoism as not being by definition out of the realm of morality. However, not
all of versions of Ethical Egoism lie within our new definition. Lawrence M. Hinman identified
three different versions of Ethical Egoism. Out of these, one falls out our definition of a moral
guide, while the difference between the remaining two becomes blurred if they are supplemented
with Gert's qualification of rationality as a prerequisite for the identification of a moral guide.
The three different versions identified by Lawrence M. Hinman are characterized as follows:
Individual Ethical Egoism (Everyone should act in my interest)
Personal Ethical Egoism (I should act in my interest, everyone else may do what they
want)
Universal Ethical Egoism (Everyone should act in their own interest)2
Individual Ethical Egoism cannot be a basis for morality within our adapted definition. When
you adopt a moral guide, the definition requires both that it seems rational to you and that you
consider its adoption to be rational for everyone else as well. In the case of an individual egoist
this would mean that it would have to be rational for a second person to promote both your and
her interests, which is impossible if these interests collide. You cannot consider it rational that
Bernd should give you chocolate and at the same time consider it rational that instead Bernd ate
the chocolate himself. Therefore, Individual Ethical Egoism cannot provide a basis for morality.
2 Lawrence M. Hinman Look out for #1  and there is no #2: Ethical Egoism (Ethics Updates - Presentation:
Ethical Egoism http://ethics.sandiego.edu/presentations/theory/EthicalEgoism/index.asp - 9/15/2006, accessed
on 18.10.08), p. 8.
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Universal Ethical Egoism, as well, does not concur with our definition unless adapted. De-
manding that everyone should do what is in their interest makes a normative demand without
qualifying the should as one which merely evaluates the rationality of the choice of principle.
If this qualification is made, Universal Ethical Egoism merges with Personal Ethical Egoism.
The egoist can at the same time concede that everyone else may do what they want and hold
that everyone else should decide to be egoists if they are rational. This combination of Personal
and adapted Universal Ethical Egoism lies within our definition of a moral guide and therefore
cannot be treated as ab initio incompatible with the requirements for a basis of morality. That
does not mean that it necessarily is a basis for morality but it implies that it could be. This
allows us to now go further into the question whether or not Egoism can be judged as right
in a moral sense of the term. Such a judgment could be based upon one out of three factors:
The intention, the act itself or the outcome.3 If Egoism can be judged as good in at least
one of these terms, then we can no longer deny the possibility of it actually representing a basis
for morality. In the last part of this essay the analysis will therefore only focus on the outcome
of Egoism, displaying that given certain prerequisites it can stand as a valid justification for
Egoism as a moral principle.
4. A Good Outcome: For Whom?
Many defenders of Egoism have taken a Utilitarian approach, arguing that Egoism leads to good
outcomes. Adam Smith, for example, proposes in The Wealth of Nations that everyone would
be better off if every person promoted her self-interest. Others try to reconcile Egoism and
Utilitarianism via sympathy or rewards in after-life.4 However, these accounts set utilitarian
standards of a good outcome. This cannot be a way to defend Egoism because Egoism clashes
with Utilitarianism by denying the existence of a Universal or Total Good which is to be
valued higher than the interest of the individual.
Derek Parfit recognizes the importance of making a very clear distinction between utilitarian
and egoistic standards. In his text Reasons and Persons he discusses the Self-Interest theory,
which is a theory about how best to apply Ethical Egoism.5 This means that any judgment on
the outcomes of the Self-Interest Theory is equal to a judgment on the consequences of Ethical
Egoism (if well-applied).
Parfit says that instead of judging the theory's success at a collective level, we should judge
the outcome at the individual level, where it succeeds by leading to better results for each person.
He explains that the Prisoner's Dilemma does not, as has often been claimed, defeat the Self-
Interest Theory; the prisoners fail as a group, but each does better. He sees no reason why
the theory should succeed at a collective level. If each person judges their interest to be more
important to herself, then each person ought to apply the Self-Interest Theory even though she
3 Lisa Jones, University of St Andrews, handout of PY1105, 30.09.2008.
4 See Charlie Dunbar Broad, Five types of Ethical Theory (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1930,
http://www.ditext.com/broad/ftet/ftet6.html, accessed on 30. 10.08), p. 159  162.
5 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. Oxford Scholarship Online.
Oxford University Press, http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019824908X.001.0001, accessed on 27.10.08), p. 90 - 92.
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would prefer if others did not apply it.
A parallel argument is given by Henry Sidgwick and Marcus G. Singer who recognize that
Egoism cannot be defeated by rational arguments: If the Egoist strictly confines himself to
stating his conviction that he ought to take his own happiness or pleasure as his ultimate end,
there seems no opening for an argument to lead him to Utilitarianism.6 In other words, if the
Ethical Egoist says that his interest is what is most important to him, then it is impossible to
have a real discussion because there is no convincing reason forcing him to consider something
else as his priority.
5. Conclusion
After all, from the perspective of each individual who applies the principle of Egoism, Ethical
Egoism can be seen as having a good outcome and as therefore providing a possible basis for
morality. This is the crucial point of every discussion about Egoism: When we ask about good
or bad, the question is whether we take the view of the universe, as does Utilitarianism, or
the view of the individual. In the end, whether or not Ethical Egoism can be a basis for morality
depends on the perspective one takes.
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